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Background: The Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance cooperation (MBDS) is one of several sub-regional disease
surveillance networks that have emerged in recent years as an approach to transnational cooperation for infectious
disease prevention and control. Since 2003 MBDS has pioneered a unique model for local cross-border cooperation.
This study examines stakeholders’ perspectives of these MBDS experiences, based on a survey of local managers
and semi-structured interviews with MBDS leaders and the central coordinator.
Results: Fifteen managers from 12 of 20 paired cross-border sites completed a written survey. They all monitor
most or all of the 17 diseases agreed upon for MBDS surveillance information sharing. Fourteen agreed or strongly
agreed with statements about the core MBDS values of cooperation, mutual trust, and transparency, and their own
contributions to national and regional disease control (average score of 4.4 of 5.0). Respondents felt they implemented
well to very well activities related to surveillance reporting (average scores 3.4 to 3.9 of 4.0), using computers for
their work (3.9/4.0), and using surveillance data for action (3.8/4.0). Respondents reported that they did worst in
implementing research (2.1/4.0) and somewhat poorly for local laboratory testing (2.9/4.0) and local coordination
with cross-border counterparts (2.9/4.0), although all 15 maintain a list with contact information for these counterparts
and many know their counterparts. Implementation of specified activities within their collective regional action
plan was uneven across the cross-border sites. Most respondents reported positive lessons learned about local
cooperation, information sharing and joint problem solving, based on trusting relationships with their cross-border
counterparts. They recommend expansion of cross-border sites within MBDS and consideration of the cross-border
cooperation model by other sub-regional networks.
Conclusions: MBDS has over a decade of experience with its model of local cross-border cooperation in disease
surveillance and control. Frontline managers have documented success with this model, strongly support it and
recommend its expansion within and beyond the MBDS network. The MBDS cross-border cooperation model is
standing the test of time as a solid approach to building and sustaining the public health capabilities needed for
disease surveillance and control from the local to national and global levels.
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Health Regulations, Public health, Global healthBackground
In today’s globalized world, infectious disease threats
have become transnational in nature and therefore
require effective transnational approaches for detection,
response and prevention [1-5]. Through the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) International Health Regulations
(IHR), nearly all countries around the world have committed
to develop and maintain core public health capacities needed* Correspondence: mmoore@rand.org
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unless otherwise stated.to detect, diagnose, report and respond to public health
threat [6]. Countries that can do so have committed to
help other countries develop their core capacities. However,
the foundation of transnational detection and response
begins locally, where diseases occur. Local officials are on
the front lines of public health surveillance and response
(Figure 1).
Self-organized sub-regional disease surveillance net-
works have emerged in recent years as a model of trans-
national public health cooperation for disease surveillance
and control [5,7-17]. Such networks have a bottom-upentral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain







Country (top-down leadership and 
commitment within country; bottom-up 
country relationship to global)
Sub-Region (bottom-up orientation: based on  
natural affiliations)
Region (top-down orientation: global organization, 
in-country presence)
World (top-down orientation: guidance, support, 
cooperation, benefit)
Figure 1 Local officials are at the front lines of public health.
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tions rather than assigned ones. They contrast with
regions organized in a top-down fashion, such as those
designated by WHO.
The Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance (MBDS) co-
operation is one of the longest standing sub-regional dis-
ease surveillance networks [7,9]. MBDS includes
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and
the Yunnan and Guangxi provinces of China. Organized
initially in 1999 and formalizing its cooperation in 2001,
MBDS has country level managers and a coordinator’s
office located in Bangkok, Thailand. MBDS stakeholders
organized their activities based on multi-year action
plans generated by MBDS members and leadership. The
plan in place at the time of this study was for 2011–
2016 and specified seven strategic areas for national
action and sub-regional cooperation: cross-border (XB)
cooperation; strengthening the animal-human health
interface and community surveillance; epidemiology
capacity building; laboratory capacity building, infor-
mation and communications capacity building; riskcommunications; and policy research [18]. Through its
XB strategy, MBDS has pioneered a specific type of
model for cooperation: a multi-country networked sys-
tem of local XB sites to cooperate directly on disease
surveillance, information sharing and joint investigation
across local international borders [9].
The term “cross-border” in the context of public
health and disease is commonly used as a synonym for
“transnational” [19-22] rather than referring literally to
local collaborations across international borders. Exam-
ples of the former focus on descriptions of cross-border
disease threats [7,19-21]. Examples of the latter focus on
local cross-border surveillance cooperation [7-9,23],
“cross-border sharing of human resources and expertise
[7], “[stamping] out the cross-border [dengue] outbreak”
[7], “cross-border response teams [7], cross-border com-
munications [8], and meetings at cross-border sites
[8,9,23]. Some uses of the term are more ambiguous as to
whether such actions as cross-border population move-
ments [7,14,23], cross-border trade [7], cross-border col-
laboration [7], and cross-border communications [7,8]
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both.
Between 2003 and 2012, MBDS established 25 XB
demonstration sites. These provide a unique, “bottom-
up,” complementary approach to local, national and
transnational disease surveillance and control. This re-
port focuses on the MBDS experience with local XB co-
operation in disease surveillance and control. It
describes insights about such cooperation as seen from
various perspectives. These include the perspectives of
local XB site managers, who are responsible for imple-
menting and managing activities at their site; MBDS
country leaders, who are responsible for coordinating
MBDS efforts in their country and contributing to de-
cision making through the MBDS Executive Board; and
the MBDS central coordinator, who is responsible for
coordinating efforts across all MBDS countries. The
study reported here examines the following research
questions:
1. How well do local XB health authorities understand
their role in national surveillance, MBDS networking,
and the WHO International Health Regulations?
2. Which areas specified for MBDS cooperation are
current public health priorities at the local level?
3. How well have MBDS strategic priorities and
activities been implemented at XB sites?
4. To what extent is surveillance data/information
shared and used locally?
5. What aspects of surveillance are working well and
less well at these sites?
6. What was the sequence of activities in developing
the XB sites?
7. What activities are viewed as the most important or
valuable at XB sites?
8. What lessons have been learned from XB
cooperation, and what advice could be offered to
others?
9. What are the prospects for sustainability of XB
cooperation, including enabling factors and barriers?
Insights from this study not only help to improve
MBDS’s own programming but also are valuable to in-
form cooperation in other disease surveillance networks
that span international borders or require communica-
tion and coordination across different agencies and orga-
nizations. In addition, public health workers broadly
focused on disease surveillance may find the results of
the study helpful as they consider collaborative ap-
proaches to disease surveillance.
Methods
The study was carried out from January 2012 to January
2013. During this time period, 20 of the 25 designatedMBDS XB demonstration sites had one or both sides op-
erational. After consultation with leaders in the MBDS
member countries, the coordinator requested in writing
that RAND’s human subjects protection committee
carry out the ethical review on their behalf. Therefore,
RAND’s human subjects protection committee approved
the study on behalf of both RAND and MBDS. Data col-
lection included a written survey during 2012 and semi-
structured interviews in early 2013, both of which
included verbal informed consent that had been approved
by RAND’s ethical review committee.
The survey questionnaire was presented and com-
pleted in English by local XB site managers. It included
both open-ended questions and closed-ended questions
with checked, binary (yes or no), or scaled (1 to 4 or 1
to 5) responses (see Additional file 1). The targeted sur-
vey sample included all MBDS XB sites, including those
pairs operating on both sides of the border and pairs
where only one side of the border was operational. The
MBDS central coordinator worked with MBDS country
leaders to ensure that representatives from as many sites
as possible had an opportunity to complete the survey.
Survey information was collected via written question-
naire and transmitted electronically to the study team. A
total of 15 XB local site managers in five of the six
MBDS countries completed surveys. These managers
represented 12 of the 20 different XB sites active at the
time of the survey (Table 1). These included paired
forms from both sides of four XB sites (one site in Lao
PDR is part of two different pairs) and single forms from
eight additional sites. Responses to the survey’s closed-
ended questions were tallied and averaged. Responses to
the open-ended questions were extracted, arrayed, and
either listed or summarized.
In addition, the RAND study team completed face-to-
face interviews with two MBDS country leaders and the
MBDS central coordinator in early 2013. These discus-
sions explored how and why certain program elements
were more or less successful than others, to help inform
replication or new approaches in the future. As with the
open-ended survey questions, responses were extracted,
arrayed and either listed or summarized.
Results and discussion
All respondents indicated that they monitor at least 14
of the 17 diseases or conditions agreed upon for MBDS
surveillance information sharing (acute flaccid paraly-
sis, avian influenza, Chikungunya fever, cholera, den-
gue, diphtheria, encephalitis, human immunodeficiency
virus [HIV], leptospirosis, malaria, measles, meningitis,
pneumonia, severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS],
tetanus, tuberculosis, and typhoid); ten indicated that
they monitor all 17 of these. Overall and not surpris-
ingly, survey respondents from the 15 sites were most
Table 1 MBDS cross-border sites and source of completed survey forms
# Status Year started # forms received Cambodia China Laos Myanmar Thailand Vietnam
1 ● 2003 1 Savannakhet (a) Mukdahan
2 ● 2003 0 Savannakhet (b) Quang Tri
3 ● 2003 2 Stung Treng Champasak (a)
4 ● 2003 0 Mengla (Yunnan) Luang Namtha
5 ● 2008 0 Bo Kaeo Chiang Rai (a)
6 ● 2008 2 Banteay Mean Chey Sakaeo
7 ● 2008 1 Takaeo An Giang
8 ● 2008 1 Kampot Kien Giang
9 ● 2008 1 Luchun (Yunnan) Lai Chau
10 ● 2008 1 Ping Xiang (Guangxi) Lang Son
11 ● 2009 1 Borikhamxay Ha Tinh
12 ● 2009 0 Vientiane Nongkhai
13 ● 2009 0 Sayabury Nan
14 ● 2011 2 Koh Kong Trat
15 Ө 2011 0 Dong Xing (proposed) Guang Ninh
16 Ө 2011 0 Kampong Cham Tay Ninh (a)
17 Ө (2012) 2 Champasak (b) Ubon Ratchathani
18 Ө (2012) 1 Svay Rieng Tay Ninh (b)
19 Ө (2012) 1 Myawaddy Mae Sot
20 Ө (2012) 0 Dong Xing Mong Cai
21 O (2012) 0 Tachilake Chiang Rai (b)
22 O (2012) 0 Battambang & Pailin Chanthaburi
23 O (2012) 0 Khammouane Nakorn Phanom
24 O (2012) 0 Khammouane Quang Binh
25 O (2012) 0 Kawthaung Ranong
Legend: O = Identified, not operational either side; Ө = Ready (coordinator, plan/TOR, or just 1 side operational); ● = Fully operational; bold = form received; italic = form not received; (a) and (b) refer to single sites
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and their local MBDS XB cooperation (Table 2). They
reported being well aware of the WHO IHR in general
but they were less aware of specific elements of the
IHR. They were more aware of the MBDS central co-
ordinator and his office, which communicates relatively
regularly with the XB sites, than with the MBDS coun-
try leaders. Respondents whose counterparts across the
border did not complete the survey (reflected as “Sin-
gles” in Table 2) were more aware of nearly all aspects
of MBDS, their country’s surveillance, and the IHR,
compared to respondents whose XB counterparts did
complete the survey (reflected as “Pairs” in Table 2).
Familiarity with MBDS, national surveillance and the
IHR was somewhat lower for respondents from the
four sites in Thailand (average score of 2.8 of 5.0) com-
pared to those from the six sites in Cambodia (4.1/5.0)
or the three sites in Vietnam (4.0/5.0). No information
on the surveys or in the interviews pointed to the rea-
sons for these differences.
Respondents were asked which of 11 specific surveillance-
related activities or capacities are priorities for their country,
MBDS, and/or the WHO IHR:
 Infectious disease surveillance
 Timely surveillance reporting
 Using surveillance information for action
 Public health capacity building
 Laboratory capacity
 Epidemiology capacity building
 Risk communications
 Communications technology capacity
 Surveillance at points of entry
 Public health emergencies of international concernTable 2 Respondent awareness/familiarity with MBDS
Description (Item) Average score
(Scale: 1 not aware to 5 ve
ALL Pairs
Number of sites 15 7
MBDS - general 3.4 2.9
MBDS - Executive board 3.5 2.4
MBDS - Country coordinator 3.9 3.3
MBDS Coordinator/coordinating office 4.0 3.4
MBDS Action plan and strategies 3.8 3.4
Cross-border (XB) cooperation 4.1 3.9
Your country’s surveillance program 4.3 4.3
IHR 4.0 4.1
IHR reporting requirements 3.5 3.0
IHR core capacities 3.3 2.9
Total 3.8 3.4 Coordination of animal and human health
The vast majority of respondents (13; 87%) indicated
that all 11 of these are important to their country (over-
all average 10.8/11); 10 (67%) indicated that all 11 are
important for MBDS (9.9/11.0); and 6 (40%) indicated
that all 11 are important to the IHR (8.9/11). These
findings are consistent with respondents’ higher famil-
iarity with their own national surveillance system and
MBDS cooperation than with details of the WHO IHR,
though general familiarity with the WHO IHR is rela-
tively high (average score for awareness/familiarity of 4.0
of 5.0).
Nearly all respondents (14; 93%) agreed or strongly
agreed with all statements about the importance of
MBDS cooperation, trust, and transparency; the consistency
of MBDS with the country’s own surveillance and
response system; the contribution of their own work
to the country’s surveillance system; and the importance
of exercises and drills (Table 3). A small minority of
respondents (3; 20%) was neutral about the statement
that their work serves the MBDS system. One respon-
dent in Thailand appeared to be an outlier and disagreed
or strongly disagreed with all of these statements.
Most respondents consider that they implement mod-
erately to very well most of the general activities associ-
ated with MBDS (Table 4). These include reporting
surveillance data to their country surveillance system
(average score 3.9 of 4.0), their XB partner (3.4/4.0) and
the MBDS Coordinator (3.5/4.0); using their surveillance
data for local action (3.8/4.0); responding locally to disease
outbreaks (3.7/4.0); coordinating human and animal
health (3.2/4.0); conducting community-based surveillance
(3.4/4.0); using computers in their work (3.9/4.0); andry aware)
Singles Cambodia Thailand Vietnam
8 6 4 3
3.9 3.2 2.8 4.0
4.5 3.7 2.5 4.3
4.4 4.2 2.8 4.3
4.5 4.7 2.8 4.3
4.1 3.7 3.0 4.3
4.4 4.7 3.5 4.0
4.4 4.5 3.5 4.7
3.9 4.5 3.3 3.3
3.9 4.0 2.3 3.7
3.8 4.0 2.0 3.3
4.2 4.1 2.8 4.0
Table 3 Values and context as reported by respondents
Description (Item) Average score
(Scale: 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree)
ALL Pairs Singles Cambodia Thailand Vietnam
Number of sites 15 7 8 6 4 3
MBDS cooperation is important 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.8 3.5 4.5
MBDS is a pioneer for cooperation 4.5 4.7 4.3 4.5 3.5 4.3
Mutual trust is important in MBDS 4.5 4.1 4.8 4.5 3.8 5.0
Transparency is important in MBDS 4.5 4.1 4.9 4.8 3.5 5.0
Your work serves MBDS system 4.1 3.7 4.5 4.3 3.8 4.3
Your work serves country system 4.4 4.1 4.6 4.5 3.8 4.7
MBDS is consistent with country’s surveillance and response system 4.3 3.9 4.6 4.3 4.0 4.7
Exercises (tabletops, simulations) and drills are important 4.5 4.1 4.9 4.7 4.0 4.7
Total 4.4 4.1 4.6 4.6 3.7 4.7
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felt that they conducted joint outbreak investigations (2.9/
4.0) and local laboratory testing (2.9/4.0) somewhat more
poorly, and conducted applied or other research poorly or
not at all (2.1/4.0). (A possible explanation for the low
perceived quality of policy research implementation is that
XB sites would not necessarily initiate, carry out or even
be aware of such research.) Respondents at sites from
which both XB partners completed the survey (“Pairs”)
reported better coordination (3.1/4.0) and surveillance
reporting (3.7/4.0) to their XB partner compared to
respondents whose XB counterpart did not complete
the survey (“Singles”, 2.8/4.0 and 3.1/4.0, respectively).Table 4 Respondent perception of quality of local implement
Description (Item) Average score
(Scale: 1 do not
ALL Pair
Number of sites 15 7
Coordinate, talk, and/or meet with XB counterparts 2.9 3.1
Report surveillance data to country system 3.9 4.0
Report surveillance data to XB partner 3.4 3.7
Report surveillance data to MBDS Coordinator 3.5 3.7
Use your surveillance info for action 3.8 3.9
Local outbreak response/investigation 3.7 3.9
Joint XB outbreak response/investigation 2.9 2.4
Coordinate human-animal health 3.2 3.1
Conduct community-based surveillance 3.4 3.1
Build and use epidemiology capacity 3.3 3.1
Conduct lab testing for priority diseases 2.9 2.7
Use computers for your routine work 3.9 3.7
Conduct risk communications 3.4 3.1
Conduct applied or other research 2.1 1.4
Total 3.3 3.2Respondents from the six sites in Cambodia felt that their
lab testing (2.5/4.0), joint outbreak investigations (2.3/4.0),
and coordination of human and animal health (2.8/4.0)
were more poorly implemented than respondents from
Thailand (3.3/4.0, 3.0/4.0, 3.5/4.0, respectively) or Vietnam
(3.3/4.0, 4.0/4.0, 3.3/4.0, respectively). Nearly all respon-
dents look at and report their surveillance data, but some-
what fewer analyze or use these data on a regular basis
(Table 5).
The XB managers were asked to indicate whether they
implement a number of specific activities that are rele-
vant to XB sites, i.e., linked to the first six key strategies
in the MBDS Action Plan for 2011–2016. (In contrast,ation
implement to 4 implement very well)
s Singles Cambodia Thailand Vietnam
8 6 4 3
2.8 2.7 3.5 2.7
3.9 4.0 3.8 4.0
3.1 3.8 3.5 2.7
3.4 3.8 3.5 3.3
3.8 4.0 3.8 3.7
3.6 3.8 3.5 3.7
3.3 2.3 3.0 4.0
3.3 2.8 3.5 3.3
3.6 3.2 3.5 3.7
3.5 3.0 3.5 3.7
3.1 2.5 3.3 3.3
4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0
3.6 3.3 3.3 3.7
2.8 2.0 2.0 2.7
3.4 3.2 3.4 3.5
Table 5 Use of surveillance data by respondents
Description (Item) Percentage of sites reporting “Yes”
ALL Pairs Singles Cambodia Thailand Vietnam
Number of sites 15 7 8 6 4 3
Look at data 93% 100% 88% 100% 100% 67%
Analyze data 87% 86% 88% 83% 75% 100%
Use data 87% 86% 88% 83% 100% 67%
Report data 93% 100% 88% 100% 75% 100%
Average (of 4 possible actions) 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.3
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ally involve activities at all XB sites.) All respondents re-
ported that they maintain a list of contact information
for their XB counterparts (Table 6). Nearly all have a
basic package of activities for their site and share surveil-
lance information as required (for agreed-upon diseases
at specified frequencies). More than three-fourths have
ever participated in a joint XB outbreak investigation;
slightly more than half have participated in at least one
meeting with their XB counterpart or had a supervisory
visit during the preceding six months. Of the six MBDS
strategies reflected in the table, implementation of
specific activities associated with epidemiology capacity
(present all sites) and XB cooperation (average 5.3 of 7
different XB-specific activities implemented) was most
common. Activities associated with information and
communications technology capacity (average 3.6 of 4
different activities in this area), animal-human health
interface and community surveillance (average 4.5 of 7
different activities), risk communications (average 1.1 of
2 activities), or laboratory capacity (average 1.6 of 3 dif-
ferent activities) were less common. The fifteen sites im-
plement an average 17.0 of the total 24 activities. The six
Cambodian sites reported implementing more activities
(average 18.7/24) than the four sites in Thailand (average
16.0/24) or the two sites reporting from Vietnam (aver-
age 15.0/24).
Respondents commented on the first activities needed
to start up an XB site, which XB activities have been
most valuable, and lessons they have learned about XB
cooperation. Nearly all reported that initial activities in-
cluded meetings with national or provincial authorities
as well as their XB counterparts, orientation and train-
ing, and sharing surveillance information with XB part-
ners. Nearly all also reported that the most valuable
activities were sharing information, meeting regularly,
and conducting joint outbreak investigations with XB
counterparts. Most reported positive lessons learned
about local cooperation, information sharing and joint
problem solving, all based on trust, mutual respect and
good relationships with XB counterparts. Respondents
also offered advice to future MBDS XB sites or to othercountries or networks that may establish similar sites.
They recognized the importance of initial local and
cross-border orientation, regular meetings with XB
counterparts to maintain good relationships, an estab-
lished agreement at the XB site, and openness and time-
liness in sharing surveillance information across borders.
Based on their experiences, they recommend expansion
of the XB model more broadly across MBDS and feel
that it is a worthwhile model for other sub-regional net-
works to consider.
Nearly all respondents commented on the aspects of
surveillance that are working well at their site. Responses
varied, with no consensus themes. Some of the reported
well-functioning elements included both routine case-
based and community event-based reporting, coordin-
ation from national to local level, and the availability of
specific guidelines and communications technologies for
surveillance reporting. Several respondents also com-
mented on aspects of surveillance that are not working
well. These include village level community surveillance
(functioning well at some sites but not well at others),
lack of local laboratory testing availability, and limited
budget and staff motivation or participation. Most
respondents explicitly noted the importance of the sus-
tainability of their XB cooperation. They were at least
moderately confident that they could sustain their efforts
if they could maintain their good relationships with XB
counterparts and receive sufficient technical and espe-
cially financial support.
Interviews with the two senior country level MBDS
managers and the MBDS central coordinator reinforced
and expanded upon the insights provided by the XB sur-
vey respondents. They all recognized the strengths and
weaknesses of MBDS cooperation over time. Strengths
include acknowledgement of the XB model as a good
foundation for building trust, sharing surveillance infor-
mation, conducting joint outbreak investigations, and
collaborating more broadly. The major weakness is that
implementation and capacity are uneven across coun-
tries and local XB sites. More specifically, these leaders
identified the need to more extensively and actively use
surveillance information for action (rather than merely
Table 6 Implementation of specific activities at MBDS XB sites
Description (Item) Percentage reporting “Yes”
ALL Pairs Singles Cambodia Thailand Vietnam
Number of sites 15 7 8 6 4 2*
Cross-border (XB) Cooperation
Maintain list of contact info for XB counterparts 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Have a basic package of activities for your site 86% 86% 86% 83% 75% 100%
Shared surveillance information as required 93% 100% 86% 100% 100% 100%
Participated in at least one meeting with another XB site in the past 6 months 57% 43% 71% 83% 50% 50%
Participated in at least one supervisory visit in the last 6 months 57% 57% 57% 67% 25% 100%
Ever participated in joint outbreak investigation 79% 71% 86% 67% 75% 100%
Participated in at least one outbreak investigation, TTX or drill past 12 months 57% 43% 71% 50% 50% 100%
Average number (of 7 possible) 5.3 5.0 5.6 5.5 4.8 6.5
Animal-human interface and community-based surveillance
Maintain list of priority zoonotic diseases 86% 86% 86% 83% 100% 50%
Maintain a list of contact information for local animal & human health counterparts 79% 86% 71% 83% 75% 50%
Participated in outbreak investigation, TTX or drill that at addressed the interface between
animal and human health in the past 12 months
57% 43% 71% 50% 50% 100%
Regularly share surveillance reports between animal and human health sectors 64% 57% 71% 67% 25% 100%
Have list of suspected diseases or events to report via community-based surveillance 71% 57% 86% 67% 50% 100%
Have tested (pilot) or implemented community-based surveillance past 6 months 36% 14% 57% 50% 0% 100%
Community-based surveillance fully operational at site 57% 29% 86% 83% 25% 50%
Average number (of 7 possible) 4.5 3.7 5.3 4.8 3.3 5.5
Human resource/epidemiology capacity
At least 1 person at site has participated in short- or long-term epidemiology course 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ICT capacity
XB site has ICT hardware/software installed, including updates. 93% 100% 86% 100% 100% 33%
XB site has received ICT training, including updates as needed. 79% 86% 71% 100% 100% 33%
XB site has access to ICT support when needed. 93% 100% 86% 100% 100% 33%
XB site routinely uses ICT for surveillance. 93% 100% 86% 100% 100% 33%
Average number (of 4 possible) 3.6 3.9 3.3 4.0 4.0 2.0
Laboratory capacity
Site has laboratory for detecting/diagnosing at least 1 priority disease 71% 86% 57% 83% 75% 0%
Site has timely access to lab testing for all priority diseases 36% 57% 14% 33% 75% 0%
Laboratory at or serving your site participated in proficiency testing past 12 months 50% 43% 57% 67% 50% 0%
Average number (of 3 possible) 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.8 2.0 0.0
Risk communications (RC)
At least 1 person at your site has received risk communications training 64% 71% 57% 83% 50% 0%
Your site has used (in a real situation) or tested (via exercise) RC past 12 months 43% 43% 43% 67% 50% 0%
Average number (of 2 possible) 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.0
Overall average number (of 24 possible) 17.0 16.6 17.4 18.7 16.0 15.0
*Only 2 of the 3 sites in Vietnam reported this information.
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countries and out to the XB level. Nonetheless, after a
decade of experience in working together, they feel that
the MBDS cooperation has been successful and the
MBDS XB model has contributed importantly to bothlocal disease control and compliance with the IHR.
They feel the XB model should be strengthened and ex-
panded—by strengthening local human, laboratory and
communications technologies and expanding to more
counterpart XB sites along the expansive MBDS
Moore and Dausey BMC Research Notes  (2015) 8:90 Page 9 of 10borders. One manager noted the political and practical
importance of local XB cooperation in areas beyond
simply disease surveillance. He further noted that sus-
tainability will depend more on governments integrat-
ing MBDS-related activities into their routine
programming and providing ongoing financial support
to do so, rather than depending on external funding
into perpetuity.
Conclusions
MBDS has more than a decade of experience with its
model of local cross-border cooperation in disease sur-
veillance and control. Frontline XB managers strongly
support this model and hope it can be sustained and ex-
panded, both within and beyond MBDS. They especially
noted the importance of relationships built on trust,
which in turn enhance disease surveillance and control
at local transborder sites. Senior MBDS officials vali-
dated these views, and recent commentaries also support
local cross-border cooperation as a promising pathway
for the future [16,24]. The MBDS Action Plan spells out
seven key strategies, of which six are directly and
strongly relevant to all XB sites and hence were the
major focus of our examination, as reported here. Sur-
vey respondents indicated that XB cooperation and epi-
demiology capacity are the strongest in underpinning
current MBDS cooperation; some key capacities remain
uneven across the XB sites, especially laboratory and com-
munications technologies/capacities. The challenges to
public health surveillance and networking have been
described [5,25]. Building and sustaining a full set of
critical public health surveillance capacities across all
MBDS XB sites will indeed be a challenge for the future.
However, the MBDS XB model is standing the test of time
as a solid approach to building and sustaining the public
health capabilities needed into the future for disease
surveillance and control from the local to national and
global level.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Cross-Border Disease Surveillance – Site Manager
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